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BOOK REVIEWS
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW. By Manfred S. Guttmacher and Henry Y. Weihofen.
New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1952. Pp. 476. $7.50.
For one with my background of training and convictions, principles and opinions,
the task of reviewing a book of this kind is rather uncongenial. Perhaps I can
make this plainer by saying that the type of book which I find consistent with facts
and sound principle is represented by the following bibliography: The Driving
Forces of Human Nature, Nature & Treatment of Mental Disorders, both by
Thomas V. Moore (Grune & Stratton); God & The Unconscious by Victor White
(Regency); The Successful Error by Rudolf Allers (Sheed & Ward); Psychiatry
& Catholicism by Vander Veldt & Odenwald (McGraw-Hill); Psychoanalysis
& Personality by Joseph Nuttin (Sheed & Ward); Psychoanalytical Method
& The Doctrine of Freud (2 vols.) by Roland Dalbiez (Longmans); Dynamic
Psychology by Thomas V. Moore (Lippincott); The Psychology of Character
by Rudolf Allers (Macmillan); What Man Has Made of Man by Mortimer Adler
(Longmans); Psychology, Science or Superstition by Grace Adams (Covici-Friede);
and Experimental Psychology by Hubert Gruender (Bruce).
By contrast with such works as these, the one under review is in many respects
unprincipled, aimless and unrealistic. It does contain a limited fund of information:
much of it morbid, much of it useless, and some both interesting and useful. But
taking the whole direction of the book, I do not know where it can lead except
to confusion and to a helpless sense of the irresponsibility of man caught up in
that vortex of bubbling muck which too much modem psychology and psychiatry
seem to resemble.
The plan of the book, so far as the subject matter of each chapter is con-
cerned, is simple and appropriate enough. The authors found that "no general
book on legal psychiatry has appeared in this country during the past quarter
century." I cannot repress the observation that, if the contents of this work
be any criterion, one need not be disturbed because no such book has appeared for
25 years. I cannot believe that the book will be very useful to an attorney faced
with the practical job of trying to commit or to avoid commitment of someone
on psychiatric grounds. Neither law students nor lawyers can be given practically
adequate instruction in the fundamentals of psychiatry by such a book as this,
Indeed, this volume tends to leave one with the impression that there are no
fundamentals of psychiatry.
The approach of the book is basically Freudian or psychoanalytic. Constantly
the authors talk about "depth" psychology. One is left wondering why moderns
are so fascinated with these depths, especially the depths that are slithering with
verminous things. Why don't they, once in a while, manifest an interest in
"height" psychology? Must we always dig and grovel into the sludge and ooze
of pornographic detail? Why are such sorry specimens of humanity constantly
trotted out as examples? Such psychologists and psychiatrists resemble doctors
who know what disease is without knowing what health means.
Psychology which is always abnormal, psychology which is singularly fascinated
or obsessed with aberrent types seems constantly to lose sight of the normal and
the psychiatrically healthful. Even when such psychology talks of psychosomatic,
it neglects the psyche. It is all well and good to undertake the somewhat self-
contradictory task of exploring the unconscious. But occasionally it might be
220
BOOK REVIEWS
wise to explore the conscious. Besides, there is the automatic subconscious of
the body-and there is the preconscious of the spirit. Why should we constantly
confine our attention to people who are tied dowtt by drives and urges and com-
pulsions of the body? Wouldn't it be more healthful on occasion to look up
to free men and to freedom of the will? We have, no doubt, bodies charged with
emotions, tensions and complexes. We have lusts and concupiscence. Has man
never betrayed the domination and transcendence of the spirit? Modem psychiatry
and psychology is, in the main, neglecting the ontological structure of man's nature
as a rational animal. That neglect makes it easier for man to forget the natural law
and sound basis for morals. Maybe they could learn something from the "Third
School" of Vienna which, is manifestly an improvement on both Freud and Jung.
Vicktor Frankl, the founder of this school, has indeed turned Freud upside down.
Whereas Freud says that religion is the universal neurosis of mankind, Frankl
says the lack of religion is the universal neurosis of modem man.
The book under review, while not pretending to be "a psychologically orientated
philosophy of the law," does pretend to be, in part at least, a "psychiatric and
legal theory."' The trouble with this theory is that it neglects the philosophy
and nature of man. For that reason the only philosophy on which sound culture
and civilization can be based is conspicuous in this book by its absence.
In the paragraphs of this book one loses, too, an understanding of law and its
philosophy-and of the timeless principles of justice.
It is wrong to suggest, as do the authors, that "certainty is the primary objective"2
of the law. Of course, there must be some certainty behind the law. Indeed, there
must be some certainty behind any body of knowledge or you simply do not
have knowledge. But just because there is certainty behind the law (and behind
all knowledge) is no reason to suppose the law is always in the quest of "certainty."
In certain areas properly covered by law certainty is unobtainable. There we
need, nevertheless, authority in general, and the authority of the State in
particular, as expressed in laws about which men could debate endlessly but by
which men end debate when further debate is profitless.
Now, one of the certainties behind our legal system-a certainty that gives
meaning to "liberty" or "responsibility" is free will. This is not to say that
man's will is always free, but that man is capable of positing free acts. The authors
of Psychiatry and The Law sometimes expressly, but more often by implication
(because of their excessive emphasis on urges and drives), cast doubt on man's
capacity for freedom of will: "Free will is the chief cornerstone of the criminal
law, while psychiatric experience of necessity develops some degree of adherence
to a philosophy of determinism."3
An example of one of the problems created but not settled by this book is
the very definition of psychiatry: "That branch of medical science which deals
with the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders." 4 Whether a person believes
in the soul or in the spirituality of the mind, or whether he is a rank materialist,
is, it seems to me, extremely important in this connection. Before you can handle
the diagnosis and treatment of disorders of the mind you ought to know what the
mind and its order are. In this book it would be as hard to find a definition
of mind as it is to find Utopia.
1. P. viii.
2. P. 4.
3. Ibid.
4. P. 5.
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Those who flatter themselves with modern methods and their efficiency will be
somewhat let down to learn that a thorough psychoanalysis, such as is recommended
by the American Psychoanalytic Association, requires a minimum of 250 hours.
A lot of lives would be lost if medical doctors were as clumsy and protracted in
their methods.
In the very first pages of this book the authors tell us that "psychiatry has
reached the point where it can tell us some significant things about the very nature
and need of law." 5 The subsequent text does not live up to this promise. What
it says about the nature of the law, and even its need, could well have been
omitted; especially since it often seems to misunderstand the nature of law.
Nor would we need modem psychiatry to dress up an ancient insight in these
words: "Law is therefore necessary, not only to hold in check an antisocial minority,
but to restrain the self-assertive and self-justificatory impulses in all of us. . ... ,
It hardly betrays much of an understanding of the law to say that "Law is the
collective effort by which we protect all of us against each of us."1 One is still
left wondering, at the end of the book, what are some of these significant things
about the very nature and need of law which modern psychiatry can deliver.
It seems to me that it is easier to learn something of genuine psychiatry and
psychology from the case books than to learn something of veritable law from modern
psychiatry as presented in this volume.
Chapter 2 is directed to the subject of "Personality Formation." But the authors
have, apparently without realizing it, been largely handicapped by their failure to
understand what the person really is. It is hardly a significant contribution to
human knowledge to say that "Mental disorders are today viewed primarily as
failures in the socio-adaptive capacity of the individual." 8 or that: "Every man
was found to have his breaking point." Centuries ago man had better definitions
of personality than this one: "Personality is the mental bone and marrow, the
basic stuff out of which the individual is made. It has been defined as 'the individual
in action.' "10
Maybe some examples of the "old faculty psychology" have been and ought to be
discarded. But what is hashed up here in the cause of personality formation is as
unworthy as the worst forms of the old faculty psychology.
Over and over again the authors tell us with an air of discovery, what no alert
person could have missed. For example: "We have no means of strictly measuring
the inborn intellectual endowments ... ."11 They present the false dilemma: "To
what degree is our personality structure hereditary and to what extent does it depend
on our environmental influences?"'1 2 Sound philosophers, spiritual writers and ordinary
persons endowed with a modicum of common sense have, over the centuries, realized
that our personality often depends more upon our free and deliberate choices than
upon either heredity or environment.
The book teems with case histories, many of which are, in the opinion of this
writer, of questionable value. It is even more questionable to rely upon some
5. P. 11.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. P. 13.
9. P. 14.
10. Ibid.
11. P. 15.
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professor's lonely and spotty researches into the conduct of monozygotic and dizygotic
twins. How can research into the lives of only 13 identical twins and 17 fraternal
twins be converted into worthy generalization? How much can a professor really
learn about the background of prison inmates in such study? How much natural
faith is mingled with scientific pretension in such research? Yet the authors quote
as meriting "serious notice"' 3 the conclusion of this futile snooper into jail-bird
biographies: "... . that criminality was biologically determined and hereditary."'
14
Ever since Charcat, Bernheim, Brewer and Freud, people in this field are not
content to say that they have certain more or less vague theories about dreams or
slips of the tongue or momentary spells of forgetfulness. They lay claim to scientific
knwwledge about the subconscious causes of these phenomena. They know the
symbols and meanings which run through dreams, etc. They know the hidden
significance of lapses and mistakes. But when you come to examine the evidence for
their dogmatic conclusions, it pales into invisibility. In the end, you are confronted
with their request that you put blind faith into what they claim to see. Once you
believe in their near-theories, as though they were scientifically established facts, you
are frequently bound hand and foot to a rigid determinism. "The behavior of human
beings is never truly accidental-it follows inalterably the pattern of stimulus and
response. It adheres to the principle of cause and effect just as certainly as a
chemical reaction does."' 5 Apparently we do what we do because we must, in response
to some stimulus. We have no free choice. Yet in other places the authors disown
an inflexible determinism.
The whole drift of this book, while at times paying lip service to the idea of
responsibility and freedom, is to excuse crime and the criminal by consigning man
to a whole series of conjectures: "defective training," "poor environment," "hereditary
impulses," etc. This drift becomes so obvious that it seems even to worry the authors
now and then, because they express the fear that one could translate this "into the
concept that all malefactors are mentally sick people," 1 as a reductio ad absurdum.
As a lawyer, I fail to see how psychology or psychiatry can render much of a
practical aid to the law upon the basis of this book's analysis of, for example, the
cases of arson (pyromania) set forth on pages 57 ff. Here is the way the authors
summarize one case-history: "The dynamics of this case seemed intelligible. Here
was a man who was sadistically treated in childhood. . . .As a child he displayed
sadistic impulses toward animals. Fire has a primitive destructive appeal. When
fate dealt him a stinging blow ...he felt compelled to fight back with all of his
stored-up destructive vindictiveness."' 7
Strange, how modems can get consolation from an ancient thought (conscience or
contrition) dressed up a little ridiculously in psychological jargon: ". . the key
to understanding the dynamics of ... depression is that a harsh superego is exacting
self-punishment for unconscious guilt feelings."' 8 Contrition and conscience make
much more sense even though they are much older than this type of word magic,
and much more forthright and conscious.
Some criminal who had over a long period of years given himself up to fits of
12. Ibid.
13. P. 17.
14. Ibid.
15. P. 24.
16. P. 26.
17. Pp. 59-60.
18. P. 63.
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ungovernable temper is excused by the statement that "There was some inner force
that was mercilessly pushing him into a repetitive anti-social pattern of behavior."'1D
One of the "grounds" for this conclusion was the following admission of the patient
himself: "I took my fist and hit the god damned wall, then I busted a milk bottle
and started cutting myself around the face . . ."2 The emphasis here spurns but
cannot disown original sin and concupiscence. The authors prefer "cacogenic factors"2 1
as more enlightening.
Apparently, for these authors, "many of the sexual laws have fallen into
desuetude." One is left wondering which laws are included in this grouping of
"many". Apparently marked "castration anxiety" explains exhibitionism.2 The
case24 of a lad named Clarence ends with the statement: "There is no specific
indication of sexual abnormality." 25 Yet two paragraphs earlier in setting forth
Clarence's case history, they say he admitted that "Hetero-sexual relations began at
thirteen and occurred, he said, every time that he went to a girl friend's house."20
Apparently, the authors blame this boy's criminality upon a physical defect and an
unharmonious home, dominated by a nagging mother.27 That man has any capacity
for self-control or any duty to master impulses or to vanquish temptation is never
adverted to.
We are informed that kleptomania and arson often constitute "masked sexuality"
or are "symbolically sex acts." No evidence, mind you, just sheer statement. But
you are to presuppose the infallibility of modem science. Some of it, apparently,
is supposed to spill over into people who call themselves scientists and write learned
tomes.
No wonder, then, that Guttmacher & Weihofen quote, with approval, the English
psychiatrist, Clifford Allen, who recommends "that we frankly teach that masturbation
is harmless and continence harmful."'28
The only part of the book that made me burst into laughter involved an intelligence
test (Stanford-Binet) given to a seventeen year old colored boy. "When asked what
'a man should do before beginning something very important,' he replied, 'get a
license.' "29 The encroachment of bureaucratic government into private affairs had
even reached poor "Lavern P."
In dealing with the subject of the "Psychiatrist on the Stand," the authors confuse
themselves and will, perhaps, confuse others by making an inane analogy. They say
that "Scientists may have to work for decades and even for centuries to find an
answer to a problem, .... but social and political problems must be answered as
they arise." 0
Certainly it is easy to discern the difference between an inquiry into the cause
and cure of cancer and an inquiry into the guilt or innocence of a man under charges
19. P. 104.
20. Ibid.
21. P. 108.
22. P. 112.
23. Pp. 100 and passim.
24. P. 118.
25. P. 119.
26. P. 119.
27. P. 121.
28. P. 136.
29. P. 184.
30. P. 206.
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of first degree murder. There may be scientific methods avialable in the one case.
But, whether they be called scientific or not, we do not have the cure to cancer.
There is no scientific apparatus or laboratory technique whereby we can learn with
certainty that Jones is or is not a murderer. All that can be derived from such
comparative reflections is this: that the scientific method has its limited place and
so do the political and social methods. It is silly to subject sociology and politics
to disparaging comparisons with experimental science. The methods of quantitative
and empiriological science is simply not available to deal with deliberate human
conduct. Empirical science is quantitative and often yields generalizations in the
form of mathematical equations. No such scientific generalization can facilitate the
application of criminal law. It is, of course, true that "a trial is not a scientific
investigation." It is just as true that an experiment in qualitative analysis is not
a trial. So what? Because a trial is not a scientific investigation it does not follow
that a trial "is not a search for objective truths."31
The authors here betray their misunderstanding of law and legal procedure. They
seem not to have learned32 that the word "fact" can easily be analyzed into five
meanings which are neither univocal nor equivocal but analogous.
"It is hard for lawyers and doctors to see eye to eye on the fundamental problem
of how to eliminate needless legalistic formality in hospitalization procedures and at
the same time maintain adequate legal safeguards against error and abuse."as I hope
lawyers will always be intransigent in protecting the rights of persons who are
proposed for hospitalization as mentally ill. After reading this book, I am more
determined than ever to place no act of blind faith in the mere judgment of
psychiatrists (who, as everyone knows, pop up on both sides of most litigated
questions of mental competence). Nothing taken from this book's psychiatry is an
improvement upon the defense of personal freedom which is always implicit and
often explicit in our legal system, no matter how the latter is criticized by the
authors.
The authors recall that Dr. Carl Binger, "a prominent New York psychiatrist," had
declared that Whittaker Chambers was "a psychopath and hence an untrustworthy
witness.'u 4 As a matter of fact, Chambers was a far better and more rational
witness than Binger, who, on the admission of the authors themselves, "in the hands
of a skillful cross-examiner like District Attorney Murphy . . . made a poor
showing."'a5
"The dividing line between truth and untruth is a shadowy one.'36 Do the authors
not realize that anything that they have offered as the truth is thus cast into doubt
by their own facile generalization? Could they not be discriminating enough to
qualify by saying: "Sometimes the dividing line, etc." In any case, authors who have
that unqualified notion of the division between truth and falsehood could hardly be
expected to make a significant contribution in a chapter entitled "Veracity".
By quoting another psychiatrist, they furnish a rather novel theory of why the
perjurer commits perjury: "The denial of the fact of the crime enables him to avoid
a psychic pain far more threatening than the penalty for the crime or for perjury."3-
31. P. 205.
32. P. 207.
33. P. 288.
34. P. "364.
35. P. 365.
36. P. 372.
37. P. 375.
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The authors talk about: "the phenomenon of confession" (non-sacramental) as being
"more likely for the neurotic than the normal individual. The neurotics either have
a harsher superego than the normal or they are less capable of tolerating its strictures.
"The superego is . . . 'that part of the parental ideology which has been
incorporated into the psychic system.' "38
On this theory people who confess crimes, people who confess their errors-for
example those who convert from Communism-are under suspicion of being
neurotic!
The authors betray amazing ignorance of the meaning of the jury system: "Taking
the verdict of the jury allows the rule of law to be tempered by the public sense
of justice in hard cases . . . It is merely the case of a jury unwilling to apply the
law as written, and using any excuse that happens to be at hand ....
When I was in law school, I learned that the jury was supposed to take the law
from the judge and apply it as defined by the judge. Psychiatry and the Law
converts the jury system into a kind of fluctuating "equity" superimposed upon the
traditional common-law-equity system. It varies from jury to jury.
The authors quote with approval Gregory Zilboorg (who, I am reliably informed,
has recently become a convert to Catholicism and who, therefore, would be the first
to retract what the authors here quote): "For what else is it, if not perjury, if a
clinician speaks of right and wrong, and criminal responsibility, and the understanding
of the nature and the quality of the criminal act committed, when he, the psychiatrist,
really knows absolutely nothing about such things .... -40 Such a view infects with
unreliability everything we can know. Why should a man presume to criticize the
law if he can understand absolutely nothing of right and wrong? Some day the
Gregory Zilboorg of today and tomorrow will rise up to condemn with the authority
of truth the Gregory Zilboorg of the foregoing quotation.
Until that happens I can only wait with expectancy. While I wait I am only
confirmed in the view that the bibliography which I set forth in the first page of
this review is far more reliable and far more enlightening than anything contained
in Psychiatry and the Law.
GOD Y P. ScHMIDt
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. By Judge Francis McCaffrey. New York: Central
Book Co., 1953. Pp. 167. $5.00.
FoREwoRD*
Words are the most penetrating radiations of the human intellect's most
fissionable material.
And yet words often gyrate crazily, without plan or pattern.1
Then confusion becomes worse confounded as men wittingly or unwittingly play
38. P. 377.
39. P. 400.
40. Pp. 406-407.
t- Lecturer in Law, Fordham University School of Law.
* This article will appear as the foreword to the above entitled book.
1. Whitehead, et al. v. United States, 245 Fed. 385, 388 (1917).
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tricks with the gyrating words,-erasing them, modifying them, substituting for
them, and even omitting them.
"And the damned grotesques
Make arabesques
Upon the shifting sands."
Only recently the Supreme Court of the United States uttered a judicial cry
of anguish in endeavoring to discern meaning in "conglomerate" layers upon layers of
words requiring skill in construction "not unlike that called for in the decipherment of
obscure palimpsest texts," which are parchments newly written upon after previous
erasures, the latter of which may or may not come to light upon clever chemical
treatment 2
Cases are to be found, indeed, in which a statute has been held to be entirely
without meaning.
The perfect statute, like perfect Justice, is "God's idea, man's ideal." We may
approach near to it, but we never achieve it.
And yet there are experts who can trace the boundaries of principle along the
shadowy marches of the amorphous, the inept and the inapt.
Even where words have vanished from a statute such men can frequently per-
ceive in the context repercussions of meaning which are eternally decisive. Thus,
in dealing with the doctrine of casus onissus (which forbids the supplying of a
missing word or concept), Judge McCaffrey demonstrates the rationale of the
rule as bottomed upon the lack of legislative power in the judiciary.4 But then
he goes on to say: "It could hardly be said to be an exercise of legislative power
to supply an omission which is in reality a part of the statute, in that the legislature
intended to include the matter when the statute was enacted." 5 Then he compares
at length a case which so held, Rural Ind. School Dist. No. 10 v. Indepcndent School
District et al.,0 with a case which rejected such a suggested innovation, Lcvbcrg
v. Schumacker.7
This is in the high tradition of Black, Blackstone, Dwarris, Maw4ell, Pomeroy,
Pound and Sedgwick, all of whom are cited in the text.
In one case, the court read the word "not" into a statute.8 In another the
court refused to read "be a minor and unmarried" as "be a minor or unmarried."9
These seeming conflicts of principle were explained in the sixteenth century
in terms of "the equity of the statute."' 0 Nowadays, we speak of "the spirit and
reason of the law.""
Judge McCaffrey quotes from the Holy Trinity Church case and says: "The
quoted words of the Supreme Court might well have been used by the 16th
2. Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 446 (1953).
3. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Drake v. Drake,
15 N.C. 110.
4. P. 27.
5. P. 28.
6. 120 Iowa 119, 94 N.W. 284 (1903).
7. 225 N.Y. 167, 121 N.E. 80S (1919).
8. Matter of Deuel, 116 A.D. 512, 101 N.Y. Supp. 1037 (1st Dep't 1906).
9. Isaac et al. v. Denver & R.G. Co., 12 Daly 340, aff'd, 102 N.Y. 718 (1886).
10. E.g., in Plowden's "model" case of Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowd. 459 A.
11. Rector & c. of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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century judges to sustain their decision in Eyston v. Studd." So that the trend
has turned full cycle.
Examples of conflicts of learned opinion in the higher reaches of statutory
construction might be multiplied. Thus, when two acts are separately enacted
at the same legislative session, without reference to each other, and amend the
same section of a previously existing statute, it has been urged that the later
act controls.' 2 There is contrary opinion, however, that the court should seek and
carry out "the dominant intent" of the legislature, irrespective of the date of
taking effect, or of enactment, of the separate acts.13
These clashes between irresistible forces and immovable objects serve to suggest
the indescribable noises present as the judicial philosopher seeks to chart his way
through the storm, past Scylla and Charybdis, toward the Beacon of the Just Result.
This calm and unhurried distillation into 167 clear, terse pages, of the "law
and order" manifest in principles of statutory construction has been safely guided
by the beacon, and it will surely bring its many readers into snug harbor.
It has been said that as the diameter of our knowledge increases, so does the
circumference of our ignorance.
Wrongly read, this theorem leads to futility. Viewing it with vision, on the
other hand, this author has been hard at work upon the diameter. And the
staccato of his incisive riveting makes music,-as men climb to the crescendo
of his thought.
JoHN F. X. FiNN'
12. Winslow v. Fleischner, 112 Ore. 23, 228 Pac. 101 (1924); Roberts v. Tice, 198
Ark. 397, 129 S.W. 2d 258 (1939); Buttorf v. York City, 228 Pa. 143, 77 At. 436
(1920); People ex rel. Davis v. Wabash R.R. Co., 276 Ill. 92, 114 N.E. 552 (1916).
13. People ex rel. Chadbourne v. Voorhis, 236 N.Y. 437, 141 N.E. 907 (1923); Report,
N.Y. Law Revision Commission, 1947, pp. 439-515, entitled "Statutory Definition of
Legislation Correcting Errors in the Form of Statutes Affected by Two or More
Amendments Enacted at the Same Legislative Session Without Reference to Each
Other."
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, Member New York Law Revision Commission.
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Upon Motion Duly Made and Seconded It Was
RESOLVED THAT
The Faculty of the School of Law of Fordham Univer-
sity records with deepest sorrow the loss of our beloved
friend, Ignatius M. Wilkinson, Dean of the School of Law.
Dean Wilkinson was a most gifted teacher, an exceptionally
able lawyer and a deVoted public servant. He possessed
the rare combination of administrative ability and sound
scholarship. His sterling integrity of character and his
fine teaching have inspired his students and associates for
the more than forty years during which he served the
school with undivided devotion.
Our deepest sympathy is extended to all the members of
Dean Wilkinson's family.
June 25, 1953
